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Abstract—In recent years, due to the wide applications of
uncertain data (e.g., noisy data), uncertain frequent itemsets
(UFI) mining over uncertain databases has attracted much
attention, which differs from the corresponding deterministic
problem from the generalized definition and resolutions. As
the most costly task in association rule mining process, it has
been shown that outsourcing this task to a service provider
(e.g.,the third cloud party) brings several benefits to the data
owner such as cost relief and a less commitment to storage and
computational resources. However, the correctness integrity of
mining results can be corrupted if the service provider is with
random fault or not honest (e.g., lazy, malicious, etc). Therefore,
in this paper, we focus on the integrity and verification issue in
UFI mining problem during outsourcing process, i.e., how the
data owner verifies the mining results. Specifically, we explore
and extend the existing work on deterministic FI outsourcing
verification to uncertain scenario. For this purpose, We extend
the existing outsourcing FI mining work to uncertain area w.r.t.
the two popular UFI definition criteria and the approximate
UFI mining methods. Specifically, We construct and improve
the basic/enhanced verification scheme with such different UFI
definition respectively. After that, we further discuss the scenario
of existing approximation UFP mining, where we can see that
our technique can provide good probabilistic guarantees about
the correctness of the verification. Finally, we present the com-
parisons and analysis on the schemes proposed in this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Association rule mining discovers correlated itemsets that
occur frequently in a database and is one of the most popular
data mining methods. The problem can be divided into sub-
problems in two phases [2]: (i) computing the set of frequent
itemsets(FI), (ii) computing the set of association rules based
on the mined frequent itemsets. We address the significance
of FI mining phase from the two aspects below:
• efficiency. The FI mining phase has an exponential time
complexity and costly [2], while the latter, rule genera-
tion, is computational inexpensive.
• security and integrity. The integrity and correctness of
the FI mining result shapes the base of the latter associate
rules utility and is the crux of result utility.
The efficiency consideration motivates businesses to out-
source the task of FI mining to cloud service providers, who
undertake the computation process and finally returns the set
of frequent itemsets together with their support counts. It
has been shown that such outsourcing computation in cloud
computing model can brings a number of benefits such as
database update, multiple source data mining scenario. In order
to make the second aspect, i.e., security and integrity, practical
and satisfactory. The existing research works contribute to
practical encryption/mapping scheme on data content and
mining results security [24]. Regarding the integrity problem,
[23], [25] proposed the resolutions to ensure the correctness
and completeness of the FI mining results. We note that the
work on security and integrity verification outsourcing FI
mining is rare, and challenging.
However, all the works above all contribute on the FI
outsourcing verification in the deterministic scenario. In other
words, they didn’t consider the intrinsic noise and uncertain-
ness of the data to be mined, which should be considered
seriously with the increasingly popularity of the uncertain data
mining need. Such uncertain data mining and computation
research originate and contribute to the practical noise-tolerant
scenarios including sensor network monitoring [14], [17],
moving object search [6], [7] and so on.
Unlike the deterministic case, mining the uncertain frequent
itemset (UFI) is more difficult because the support count has to
rely on the existence possibility of the items. In fact, there exist
two different semantic explanations on UFI, that is, expected
support-based frequent itemset [9] and probabilistic frequent
itemset [3]. It has been shown that, as a generalized form
and extension of deterministic FI mining, UFI mining is more
complicated and can be divided into: exact expected support-
based UFI mining [1], [8], [9], [12], exact possible world
semantics (PWS) based UFI mining [3], [20], and approximate
Poisson, Normal distribution based UFI mining [4], [22]
resolutions. To our best knowledge, the research on uncertain
frequent itemsets(UFI) mining in outsouring environment is
still a blank.
The first step towards solving the integrity problem is to
understand the behavior of a potentially abnormal service
provider that can undermine the integrity of the mining results.
A cloud service provider may return inaccurate results if (i)
it is honest but sloppy, e.g., there are bugs in its mining
programs or suffer from random faults; (ii) it is lazy and
tries to reduce costly computation, e.g., it mines only a small
portion of the dataset; (iii) it is malicious and purposely returns
wrong results, e.g., a business competitor has paid the service
provider for providing incorrect results so as to affect the
business decisions of the data owner. The concept of result
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integrity should thus be defined on two criteria:
• Correctness: All returned frequent itemsets are actually
frequent and their returned support counts are correct.
• Completeness: All actual frequent itemsets are included
in the result.
It is worth mentioning that the completeness aspect veri-
fication is based on the correctness aspect, with the help of
the maximal FI techniques we can complete the completeness
verification similar to [23], thus in this paper, our focus is
the verification of the correctness. In this paper, we aim to
define the soundness of our verification schemes against the
two different abnormal levels as follows:
• Random fault/ stupid cloud attack tolerant level: which
verifies the abnormal results caused by the random faults
or the attack raised by stupid cloud service provider who
is unaware of the verification mechanism;
• Smart cloud attack tolerant level: which can verifies
the abnormal result returned by the attack raised by
smart cloud service provider who is knowledge of the
verification mechanism well.
Now we summarize the contribution in this paper as follows:
1) We extend the existing outsourcing FI mining work
to uncertain area w.r.t. the two popular UFI defini-
tion criteria and the approximate UFI mining methods.
Specifically, we design the basic checker mechanism
verification for expected support UFI definition to verify
the random fault, then propose two enhanced schemes
based on the private random weights mechanism for the
sake of smart cloud attack verification.
2) Then we explore and design the basic/enhanced verifi-
cation scheme for PWS based UFI definition, which is
able to verify random fault/smart attack. We address the
efficiency difficulty of the private weight based enhance-
ment scheme for PWS case, and explore and reduce the
computation complexity by eliminating the enumeration
of the possible worlds, which raise the efficiency of the
enhanced weighted resolution significantly.
3) As the bridge of the two different UFI definition, we
further discuss the case of approximation UFI mining
verification, where we reduce the verification to the
expected support verification and provide good proba-
bilistic guarantees about the correctness of verification.
Finally, we prove the effectiveness and efficiency of the
methods proposed in this paper by extensive experiments
on synthetic and real datasets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: ...
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of secure outsourcing the task of data mining
with accurate result is emerging recently. While, most of the
existing research focus on the security and privacy-preserving
aspect. [15] proposed a privacy-preserving outsoucing res-
olution for SVM training and predicting model based on
the approximate algorithm on privacy support vectors. [16]
TABLE I
UNCERTAIN DATABASE WITH ITEM POSSIBILITY
TID Transaction
T1 a(a1)b(b1)c(c1)d(d1)e(e1)
T2 a(a2)b(b2)c(c2)d(d2)e(e2)
T3 a(a3)b(b3)c(c3)d(d3)e(e3)
· · · · · · · · ·
Tn a(an)b(bn)c(cn)d(dn)e(en)
utilized the reduce SVM and random transformation technol-
ogy to deal with the SVM outsoucring problem, to achieve
privacy and accuracy. [24] addressed the security issues in
outsourcing association rule mining. An item mapping and
transaction transformation approach was proposed to encrypt
a transactional database and to decrypt the mined association
rules returned from a service provider. We can cite more
related works on the privacy and security issue on outsourcing
database area such as [5], [26], etc.
Unlike the privacy-preserving outsourcing problem for data
mining, the integrity and verification problem is more difficult
and challenging. Though a number of papers have been pub-
lished on the integrity verification of the outsourced database
model [10], most of them focus on the traditional database
queries such as point and range queries [13], [19], which
return the original qualified tuples or transactions. For that
purpose, Merkle trees based approaches can be designed to
achieve authentication and verification. On the contrary, in the
outsourced data mining model, query results are composed
of statistical aggregations (e.g., itemset counts in association
rule mining, centroid computation in clustering). The popular
Merkle trees based technique is thus not applicable.
To our best of knowledge, there are few work on it. [25]
proposed an audit environment, which consists of a database
transformation method and a result verification method based
on artificial itemset planting (AIP) technique. But such method
will introduce extra mining burden due to the extra fake
planted database, which will influence the verification con-
fidence. Due to this reason, the author propose an alternative,
more robust approach for solving the integrity problem, which
is based on an aggregate verification mechanism built on
inclusion-and-exclusion principle in [23]. But both approaches
are limited in deterministic world, thus not fit the uncertain
case.
III. BASIC DEFINITION AND ARCHITECTURE
Assume an uncertain database T with n transactions
{t1, t2, . . . , tn}, composed by the items {a, b, c, d, e}. Specifi-
cally, the ith transaction ti with item appearing probability for
{ai, bi, ci, di, ei} for {a, b, c, d, e}. Then if ai = 0, the item a
doesn’t appear in ti; similarly, the item exists definitely in ti
when ai = 1. It is easy to see that once {ai, bi, ci, di, ei} =
0 or 1,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, the uncertain scenario will turn into
the traditional deterministic case. Below we will introduce the
definition of the deterministic FI and UFI respectively.
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A. Deterministic Support-based Frequent Itemset
Definition 1 (Deterministic FI ). Given a minimum support
ratio min sup, an itemset X is an deterministic support-
based frequent itemset if and only if the support exceeds the
minimal support threshold
sup(X) =
n∑
i=1
Ii(X) ≥ n ·min sup (1)
where X can be an item or composite itemset, and the function
Ii(X) indicates whether transaction ti contains such itemset
X .
Ii(X) =
{
1 if X ⊆ ti
0 otherwise
As illustrated before, though the deterministic FI definition
is concise and has considerable significant works such as
Apriori [2], FP-growth [11] and H-Mine [18], it is limited
to real life applications.
Below we introduce the two semantic definitions of UFI.
The first is Expected Support-based UFI definition, then comes
the Probabilistic World Semantic(PWS) based definition.
B. Uncertain Frequent Itemset(UFI) Definition
Definition 2 (Expected Support-based UFI). Given a minimum
expected support ratio min esup, an itemset X is an expected
support-based frequent itemset if and only if the expected
support
esup(X) =
n∑
i=1
pi(X) ≥ n ·min esup (2)
where pi(X) indicated the possibility of the item existence in
transaction ti. Under the popular assumption that existence
of different items is statistical independent [9], [3], [4], the
probability of itemset X can be obtained by simply multiplying
the individual item probabilities pi(x) as in Equation (2)
below:
pi(X) =
∏
x∈X
pi(x)
We note that the definition in Equation (2) can be seen as
a natural generalization of the deterministic FI definition in
Equation (1) with possibility function pi(X) in Equation (2)
instead of inclusion function Ii(X).
Though the definition of Expected Support-based FI uses
the expectation to measure the uncertainty, which is a sim-
ply extension of the definition of the frequent itemset in
deterministic data and is known as an important statistic, it
cannot show the complete probability distribution. Therefore,
the other semantic based definition is offerer in Probabilistic
World Semantic(PWS). Furthermore, most prior researches
believe that the two definitions should be studied respectively
in [20], [3], [22], we first give the definition of Possible World
below.
Definition 3 (Possible World). A possible worldW is a deter-
ministic sample or subseteq of uncertain database T , whose
possible denoted as PT (W ) and obtained by the multiply of
the presence and absence possibility according to the item
independence assumption.
PT (W ) =
∏
IW (x,i)=1
pi(x) ·
∏
IW (x,i)=0
(1− pi(x)) (3)
where function IW (x, i) indicates whether the item x in
transaction ti is contained in world W .
IW (x, i) =
{
1 if x ⊆ ti ∈ W
0 otherwise
Now we use notation WT to represent the possible world
set of uncertain database T and introduce the PWS based UFI
definition as follows.
Definition 4 (Probabilistic World Semantic(PWS) based UFI).
Given a minimum support ratio min sup, and a probabilistic
frequent threshold pft, an itemset X is a probabilistic frequent
itemset if and only if its frequent probability, obtained by
the sum of qualified possible worlds possibilities, denoted as
Pr(X) satisfies 1:
Pr(X) = Pr(sup(X) ≥ min sup)
=
∑
W∈WT
PW (T ) · [sup(X,W ) ≥ min sup] ≥ pft
(4)
C. Architecture of verification framework
In this section, we will address the architecture of the ver-
ification framework. We summarize the two possible choices
of verification resolution in this paper as in Figure 1. Now we
illustrate the two choices respectively according to the .
The pre-mining architecture. As in Figure 1(a), the audit
and verification environment consists of a database transforma-
tion method and a result verification method based on artificial
fake database plant technique. Because the construction of the
environment is before the actual computation of FIs, thus it
belongs to the pre-mining architecture according to [23], [25].
Intuitively, the method following Figure 1(a) will introduce
extra computation burden due to the extra fake database, which
will be the crux and influence the verification confidence.
The post-mining architecture. Due to this reason, the other
verification choice in Figure 1(b) can be utilized to avoid such
bottleneck, where the architecture use some specific checker
mechanism to achieve verification. Obviously, the checker
mechanism preforms right after the mining phase, thus it can
be seen as the post-mining architecture. Specifically, for FI
mining, [23] proposed a representative based on the inclusion-
and-exclusion principle.
Here it is worth mentioning that the two choices of integrity
verification are both applicable to deterministic and uncertain
data mining cases, thus general to all algorithms. But there
is no paper working on the uncertain scenario and problems.
1we use the Iversion symbol in book of Concrete Mathematics for the
elegancy of equation
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(a) pre-mining architecture based on extra artificial database (b) post-mining architecture with checker mechanism
Fig. 1. Two possible architectures for integrity verification of outsourcing frequent itemset mining
Specifically, for FIs mining, only exist [23], [25] for determin-
istic discussion. In this paper, we will follow the way of post-
mining mechanism based on checker mechanism and explore
the verification resolution for UFI mining.
IV. DETERMINISTIC FI MINING VERIFICATION
In order to verify every returned frequent itemset, we will
create a count checker for each maximal itemset X(which
is frequent itself, but all its supersets are not frequent). This
method is expected to be efficient since the number of maximal
itemsets X is expected to be much smaller than the size of
itemsets number. In this section, we will illustrate the existing
FI verification scheme in [23].
A. Basic count checker verification
Definition 5 (Count checker ). Let X be an itemset, referred to
as the checkset. The count checker of X, denoted by X∗.cnt,
is defined as the total support count of its non-empty subsets,
that is, | {t | t ∈ T and t ∩X 6= ∅} |.
In the deterministic FI mining scenario, for single item
FI X such as B,C, we get X∗.cnt = X.cnt = sup(X),
thus B∗.cnt = sup(B), C∗.cnt = sup(C). For ex-
ample, if the database T contains 5 transactions, that is,
T = {ABC,AB,ABD,CD,AD}, then {B}∗.cnt = 3,
{C}∗.cnt = 2. The complex itemset case can be computed
by the one scan of the database T according to the definition
in Definition 5. Hence {BC}∗.cnt = 4 in the example above.
The other way is to compute the count checker of complex
itemset is by inclusion-exclusion principe. Take X = BC as
an example, we define sup(B∪C) as the support count of the
any subset of BC, which can be thus {BC}∗.cnt = sup(B ∪
C) = sup(C) + sup(B) − sup(BC) = 2 + 3 − 1 = 4, thus
the verification scheme can be done by one scan complexity
O(n) as summarized in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1 (deterministic FI checker verification). In deter-
ministic database outsourcing mining, the verification based
on inclusion-exclusion principe count checker is effective, that
is to say,
X∗.cnt =
|X|∑
i=1
∑
Y⊆X,|Y |=i
(−1)i+1sup(Y )
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 can be achieved by the
inclusion-exclusion principle on the subset of X , thus we
neglect the details here.
Consider the previous example, where {BC}∗.cnt = 4
is obtained by scanning the database and assume that cloud
returns sup(B) = 3, sup(C) = 2 and sup(BC) = 2.
Computing {BC}∗.cnt = sup(B∪C) = sup(B)+sup(C)−
sup(BC) = 3 + 2 − 2 = 3 using according to the
equation above, the result is different from the real checker
{BC}∗.cnt = 4. As a consequence, we can know that cloud
party is not honest since the verification detects such fraud.
We note that the basic checker verification mechanism is can
detect the random fault/stupid cloud attack, that is to say, if
an honest/stupid cloud returns the result, the basic verification
scheme can detect it. However, once a smart cloud aware of
this mechanism and returns sup(B) = 3, sup(C) = 2 and
sup(BC) = 1, then the detection will fail as {BC}∗.cnt =
sup(B∪C) = sup(B)+sup(C)−sup(BC) = 3+2−1 = 4,
which will make the scheme unsetting.
Obviously, the verification method in Theorem 1 will not
bring into any extra computation cost for the cloud party,
therefore, it is efficient and can detect random fault/stupid
cloud attack abnormal.
B. Attack-Resistant Checkers with Private Weights
. In order to prevent such attacks, the checker should include
private information that is only known to the database owner,
so that cloud party cannot reproduce the same aggregate result
without knowing the private parameters.
The parameters impose a virtual database transformation;
the data owner applies the verification on the transformed
database T ′ instead of the original T . T ′ is generated by
replicating each transaction t ∈ T by a weight wt, which is
determined by the private parameters. We stress that the trans-
formation is never actually performed or materialized; instead
the mechanism only assumes that this transformation has been
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done but uses the mining result from cloud service provider
and the original database T to complete the verification.
We now discuss the details of the transformation and the
adapted checking mechanism. We assign a random weight wx
on each item x. The set of item weights constitute the private
information held by data owner itself. Now, we assume that
the database is not T , but a transformed database T ′, such
that for each transaction t ∈ T , there are wt transactions in
T ′ , where wt =
∏
x∈t wx. For example, if wA = 6, wB = 4,
transaction {AB} has a weight of wA × wB = 24, thus it
appears 24 times in T ′.
For example, if the original database T = {AB,A,B}, then
sup(A) = sup(B) = 2, sup(AB) = 1, {AB}∗.cnt = 3.
According to the private mechanism, without loss of gen-
erality, we choose the random private weights wA = 2,
wB = 3, then after such virtual transformation, we can note
T → T ′ : {AB × 6, A× 2, B × 3}. Now we can compute the
new support counts in the transformed virtual database T ′ as
below:
sup(A)T ′ = wAwBsup(AB) + wA(sup(A)− sup(AB)) = 8
sup(B)T ′ = wAwBsup(AB) + wB(sup(B)− sup(AB)) = 9
sup(AB)T ′ = wAwBsup(AB) = 6
And compute the new count checker {AB}∗.cnt = wA +
wB + wAwB = 11 by one scan of the database T ′. Then the
verification equation can be established as
{AB}∗.cnt = sup(A)T ′ + sup(B)T ′ − sup(AB)T ′
= wAsup(A) + wBsup(B) + (wAwB
− wA − wB)sup(AB)
= 8 + 9− 6 = 11
Now we can see that the verification don’t require the actual
transformation from T to T ′, instead we can assumes that done
but utilize the support count from the returned database T to
complete the new checker verification above.
In fact, for any frequent itemset X , we can complete the
computation of X∗.cntT ′ on the transformed database T ′ with
one scan. Furthermore,s we can follow a similar procedure as
Theorem 1 to complete the verification based on the inclusion-
exclusion principle in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (deterministic private weights based checker
verification). In deterministic database outsourcing mining,
the verification based on inclusion-exclusion principe private
count checker is effective, that is to say,
X∗.cntT ′ =
∑
Y⊆X,|Y |>0
(
∑
Z⊆Y,|Z|>0
(−1)|Y−Z|
∏
z∈Z
wz)sup(Y )T
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2 can be referenced to [23].
Similarly, the private weights based verification method in
Theorem 2 also will not bring into any extra computation
cost for the cloud party and satisfy somewhat good efficiency.
Therefore, we can get the conclusion in this section as Re-
marks: in deterministic outsourcing FI mining scenario, the
basic checker mechanism and its enhanced private weights
based resolution can both be built effectively.
Below we will explore the FI outsourcing mining problem
in uncertain scenario, which extends the existing work and
is still a blank to our best of knowledge. As illustrated in
Section III, there exist two different UFI definition, Expected
Support-based UFI and PWS based UFI, thus we will explore
and address the outsourcing UFI mining verification in the
later Section V and Section VI repectively.
V. EXPECTED SUPPORT-BASED UFI VERIFICATION
Due to the deterministic FI mining can be seen as a
special case of UFI mining, that is, when the appearance
probability {ai, bi, ci, di, ei} = 0 or 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the scenario
turns into the traditional deterministic database case above. In
this section we will follow the Expected Support-based UFI
definition.
A. Basic count checker verification
Below we first extend the count checker into the uncer-
tain scenario and propose the Expected Support-based count
checker.
Definition 6 (Expected Support-based count checker). Let
X be an itemset, referred to as the checkset. The Expected
Support-based count checker of X, denoted by X∗.ecnt, is
defined as the total probability of its non-empty subset, that
is,
∑
t{p(t) | t ∈ T and t ∩X 6= ∅}.
Similar to the deterministic FI mining scenario, for single
item itemset X such as A,B, we get X∗.ecnt = X.ecnt =
esup(X), thus A∗.ecnt = esup(A) =
∑n
i=1 ai, B
∗.ecnt =
esup(B) =
∑n
i=1 bi.
The complex itemset case can be computed by one scan
of the database T according to Definition 6, specifically,
according to the possibility of the reverse event
{AB}∗.ecnt = esup(A ∪B) = esup(A ∩B)
=
n∑
i=1
(1− (1− ai)(1− bi))
=
n∑
i=1
(ai + bi − aibi)
Similar to the case of deterministic FI mining, the other
way to compute the checker of {AB}∗.ecnt is by inclusion-
exclusion principe. Thus the verification can be preformed by
one scan complexity O(n), summarized in Theorem 3 below.
Theorem 3 (basic checker verification for Expected Support-
-based FI). The verification and checker based on inclusion-
exclusion principe can fit the Expected Support-based FI
definition, specifically,
X∗.ecnt =
|X|∑
i=1
∑
Y⊆X,|Y |=i
(−1)i+1esup(Y )
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3 is similar to The-
orem 1.The base is that for all single item itemset X ,
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X∗.ecnt = X.ecnt = esup(X), furthermore, the general
complex X can be induced by the inclusion-exclusion princi-
ple.
Obviously, we noted that the basic checker verification for
Expected Support-based FI definition in Theorem 3 will not
bring into any extra computation cost for the cloud party,
therefore, it is efficient.
For a simple example, X = AB, according to the inclusion-
exclusion principle, we can establish the verification equation:
{AB}∗.ecnt = esup(A) + esup(B) − esup(AB). Here we
build a simple database with two transactions and two items
A and B in the table below as T and assign them different
random existence possibilities. According to the definition
TID Transaction
T1 A(0.5)B(0.6)
T2 A(0.4)B(0.5)
of Expected Support-based FI in Equation (2). We can
get the expected support count from the cloud party with
esup(A) =
∑n
i=1 ai = 0.9, esup(B) =
∑n
i=1 bi = 1.1,
esup(AB) =
∑n
i=1 aibi = 0.5. According to the inclusion-
exclusion principle, we can compute
{AB}∗.ecnt = esup(A) + esup(B)− esup(AB)
= 0.9 + 1.1− 0.5 = 1.5
Then according to the one scan computation method, we
can recompute and get the verification below
{AB}∗.ecnt =
2∑
i=1
(ai + bi − aibi)
= (1− 0.5× 0.4) + (1− 0.6× 0.5)
= 0.8 + 0.7 = 1.5
= esup(A) + esup(B)− esup(AB)
B. Enhanced Checkers with Private Weights
Similar to the discussion in Section IV, the basic checker
mechanism maybe suffer the smart cloud party attack which
will pass the inclusion-exclusion principle based verification.
It is worth noting that the similar problem goes with the basic
scheme above for expected-support based UFI computation.
Thus we will explore the similar privacy weighted parameters
enhanced scheme below.
Similarly, we will aim to design such private random param-
eters based virtual database transformation. In other words, the
data owner applies the verification on the transformed database
T ′ instead of the original T .
1) first scheme: First we follow the similar way to set
the random private item weights. Then unlike the case of
deterministic FI mining, we generate the T ′ by item existence
possibility scaling operation, specifically, multiplying the each
item existence possibility by weight wt, which is determined
by the product of the private item weights as
∏
x∈t wx. Here
we note that we choose the multiplication operation as the vir-
tual transformation operation rather than the replication, which
can meet the property of uncertain database well. What’s more,
the deterministic scenario replication transformation is just a
special case of possibility scaling on integer possibility.
We now discuss the details of the transformation and the
adapted checking mechanism. We assign a random weight wx
on each item x.
Take the previous example, if wA = 0.4, wB = 0.5,
then transaction AB will scale up with M =
∏
x∈AB wx =
wAwB = 0.4×0.5 = 0.20, thus the original uncertain database
T can be transformed into the virtual form T ′ below:
TID Transaction
T1 A(0.5M = 0.10)B(0.6M = 0.12)
T2 A(0.4M = 0.08)B(0.5M = 0.10)
Now we can compute the new expected support counts in
the transformed virtual database T ′ as below:
esup(A)T ′ = 0.5M + 0.4M = 0.9M = Mesup(A)T
esup(B)T ′ = 0.6M + 0.5M = 1.1M = Mesup(B)T
esup(AB)T ′ = 0.3M
2 + 0.2M2 = 0.5M2 = M2esup(AB)T
Then we compute the new count checker by inclusion-
exclusion principle
{AB}∗.ecnt = Mesup(A)T +Mesup(B)T −M2esup(AB)T
= 0.18 + 0.22− 0.02 = 0.38
Through one scan of the database T ′, the verification equation
can be established as
Then according to the one scan computation method, we
can recompute and get the verification below
{AB}∗.ecnt =
2∑
i=1
(ai + bi − aibi)
= (1− 0.9× 0.88) + (1− 0.92× 0.9)
= 0.38
We note that the example above, the transformed existence
possibilities in T ′ for all items are all below 1 due to the
choice of wA = 0.4, wB = 0.5. In fact, even when we
choose the large such verification will still succeed because
the verification equation below isn’t related with constant 1.
{AB}∗.ecnt = esup(A) + esup(B)− esup(AB)
=
n∑
i=1
(ai + bi − aibi)
Thus wA = 4, wB = 5 which will result in M = 20 and
TID Transaction
T1 A(0.5M = 10)B(0.6M = 12)
T2 A(0.4M = 8)B(0.5M = 10)
will not break such effectiveness. And the privacy weights
choice and virtual transformation can be relaxed and easy.
Thus the verification can be preformed by one scan com-
plexity O(n), summarized in Theorem 4 below.
Theorem 4 (First private weights based checker verification
for Expected Support-based FI). The verification and checker
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based on inclusion-exclusion principe can fit the Expected
Support-based FI definition, specifically,
X∗.ecnt =
|X|∑
i=1
∑
Y⊆X,|Y |=i
(−1)i+1M iesup(Y )T
where M =
∏
x∈I wx, I is the item set.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3 can be completed be-
low. According to the first private weights based verification
scheme, the base is that ∀|X| = 1, X∗.ecnt = X.ecntT ′ =
M · esup(X)T , then similarly, ∀|X| = i, X.ecntT ′ = M i ·
esup(X)T , Thus the general case X∗.ecnt can be induced by
the inclusion-exclusion principle.
In the example above, I = {A,B}, M = wAwB = 0.2,
thus equation {AB}∗.ecnt = Mesup(A)T + Mesup(B)T −
M2esup(AB)T can be deduced by Theorem 4.
2) Second scheme: The private weights based checker
mechanism is based on multiplying the product of the private
item weights M =
∏
x∈t wx in the transaction . The idea is
extended from the deterministic scenario naturally. Now we
propose another multiplication based transformation operation
on the isolated item possibilities, instead of the whole product
of the item weights in the transaction.
Take the previous example, if wA = 0.4, wB = 0.5, now
the original uncertain database T can be transformed into
the virtual form T ′ via multiplying the item possibility by
corresponding private weights instead of the whole weight
product M below:
TID Transaction
T1 A(0.5wA = 0.20)B(0.6wB = 0.30)
T2 A(0.4wA = 0.16)B(0.5wB = 0.25)
Now we can compute the new expected support counts in
the transformed virtual database T ′ as below:
esup(A)T ′ = 0.5wA + 0.4wA = 0.9wA = wAesup(A)T
esup(B)T ′ = 0.6wB + 0.5wB = 1.1wB = wBesup(B)T
esup(AB)T ′ = 0.3wAwB + 0.2wAwB = 0.5wAwB
= wAwBesup(AB)T
Then we compute the new count checker by inclusion-
exclusion principle
{AB}∗.ecnt = wAesup(A)T + wBesup(B)T − wAwBesup(AB)T
= 0.36 + 0.55− 0.10 = 0.81
Then according to the one scan computation method, we
can recompute and get the verification below
{AB}∗.ecnt =
2∑
i=1
(ai + bi − aibi)
= (1− 0.8× 0.7) + (1− 0.84× 0.75)
= 0.81
Thus the verification can be preformed by one scan com-
plexity O(n), summarized in Theorem 5 below.
Theorem 5 (Second private weights based checker verification
for Expected Support-based FI). The verification and checker
based on inclusion-exclusion principe can fit the Expected
Support-based FI definition, specifically,
X∗.ecnt =
|X|∑
i=1
∑
Y⊆X,|Y |=i
(−1)i+1
∏
z∈Y
wzesup(Y )T
where wz is the privacy weight of item z ∈ I , I is the item
set.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 5 can be completed as
follows. According to the second private weights based ver-
ification scheme, the base is that ∀|X| = 1, X∗.ecnt =
X.ecntT ′ = wXesup(X)T , then similarly, ∀|X| = i,
X.ecntT ′ =
∏
z∈X wz · esup(X)T , Thus the general case
X∗.ecnt can be induced by the inclusion-exclusion principle
in Theorem 5.
In the example above, I = {A,B}, wA = 0.4, wB =
0.5, thus {AB}∗.ecnt = wAesup(A)T + wBesup(B)T −
wAwBesup(AB)T can be deduced by Theorem 5.
Similarly, the two private weights based verification
method in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 both will not bring into
any extra computation cost for cloud party and satisfy good
efficiency. Therefore, we can get the conclusion in this section
as Remarks: in expected support-based outsourcing FI min-
ing scenario, there exists effective basic checker mechanism,
and its enhanced private weights based resolutions can also
be built effectively.
VI. PROBABILISTIC PWS BASED UFI VERIFICATION
Though expected support-based UFI definition utilizes the
support expectation to measure the uncertainty of items,
which is a simply extension of the deterministic case and
can be finished with somewhat low cost, it cannot show
the complete probability distribution. In order to overcome
this problem, Probabilistic World Semantic(PWS) based UFI
definition was proposed. However, the characteristics of PWS,
the combinational relation between the transactions, differs
from the previous simple support sum and expected support
sum of the FIs when deterministic FI and expected support-
based UFI definition. Now we explore whether we can obtain
similar potential checker mechanism with such PWS based
UFI definition. Below we can easily get the similar PWS based
count checker definition below.
A. Basic count checker verification
Definition 7 (PWS based count checker). Let X be an itemset,
referred to as the checkset. The PWS based count checker of
X, denoted by X∗.pcnt, is defined as the total probability of
its non-empty qualified possible worlds w.r.t. to the minimum
support ratio min sup,
X∗.pcnt =
∑
t
Pr[sup(t) ≥ δ | t ⊂ X, t 6= ∅]) (5)
where threshold δ = n ·min sup.
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According to Definition 7, for all the single item itemset X
such as A,B, we can get{
A∗.pcnt = Pr[sup(A) ≥ δ]
B∗.pcnt = Pr[sup(B) ≥ δ]
In fact, for the general itemset X , X∗.pcnt = X.pcnt =
Pr(X). Take simple set AB as example,
AB.pcnt = Pr[sup(AB) ≥ δ]
Below we explore the verification of {AB}∗.pcnt according
to Definition 7.
{AB}∗.pcnt = Pr[sup(A ∪B) ≥ δ]
= Pr[sup(A) ≥ δ ∨ sup(B) ≥ δ] (6)
Now we can deduce from the Equation(6) with inclusion-
exclusion principle,
{AB}∗.pcnt = Pr[sup(A) ≥ δ] + Pr[sup(B) ≥ δ]
− Pr[sup(AB) ≥ δ]
= A.pcnt+B.pcnt−AB.pcnt
(7)
We note that the probability of the parts A.pcnt, B.pcnt,
AB.pcnt in Equation (7) will be computed and returned by
cloud party. Meanwhile, in the other way, we can find that
{AB}∗.pcnt can be obtained by the inverse event probability
as in Equation (8),
{AB}∗.pcnt = Pr[sup(A) ≥ δ ∨ sup(B) ≥ δ]
= 1− Pr[sup(A) < δ ∧ sup(B) < δ]
= 1− Pr[0 < sup(A) < δ ∧ 0 < sup(B) < δ]
− Pr[sup(A) = 0 ∧ sup(B) = 0]
(8)
According the similar analysis before, the part
Pr[sup(A) = 0 ∧ sup(B) = 0] can be computed by
by one scan complexity O(n) as ∏ni=1(1− ai)(1− bi). Then
when we combine Equation (7) and (8), we can get
{AB}∗.pcnt = A.pcnt+B.pcnt−AB.pcnt
= 1− Pr[0 < sup(A) < δ ∧ 0 < sup(B) < δ]
−
n∏
i=1
(1− ai)(1− bi)
(9)
Thus once the part λ = Pr[0 < sup(A) < δ ∧ 0 <
sup(B) < δ] can be computed and returned along with
the frequent itemset probabilities such as A.pcnt, B.pcnt,
AB.pcnt by some specific PWS based UFI mining algorithm,
{AB}∗.pcnt can be verified by one scan of the database as in
Equation (10). Then we can build the basic checker mechanism
for the general itemset X in Theorem 6 below.
Theorem 6 (PWS based Probability basic count checker verifi-
cation). In UFI outsourcing mining, the verification is effective
with the basic count checker when PWS based Probability FI
definition. Specifically, for general itemset X ,
{X}∗.pcnt =
|X|∑
i=1
∑
Y⊆X,|Y |=i
(−1)i+1Y.pcnt
= Pr[
∧
z∈X
0 < sup(z) < δ]
= 1− Pr[
∧
z∈X
0 < sup(z) < δ]
−
n∏
z∈X,i=1
(1− zi)
(10)
Proof: The evidence is obvious. On one side, the gen-
eral {X}∗.pcnt can be computed by the inclusion-exclusion
principle as
∑|X|
i=1
∑
Y⊆X,|Y |=i(−1)i+1Y.pcnt. On the other
side, it can be represented by the inverse probability as
1−Pr[∧z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ]−∏nz∈X,i=1(1− zi), which is
the general form of Equation (10).
Now we note that part Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ] is
somewhat confusing and difficult for us to compute. Thus here
we should answer two questions:
1) whether the computation of Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) <
δ] is necessary;
2) If so, how can we design such a efficient way for
cloud party to resolve it efficiently.
First, we give the example with X = AB, δ = 1, 2
in Figure 2 to illustrate the necessity of Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 <
sup(z) < δ] with the possible worlds possibilities points.
In Figure 2(a)(b), the horizontal and vertical axes represent
the support of the item of B and A, then each coordinate
point with one pair of support value represents the sum of
the possible world possibilities, e.g., the point (0, 0) represent
Pr[sup(A) = 0 ∧ sup(B) = 0], and (x, y) represents
Pr[sup(A) = y ∧ sup(B) = x]. As in Figure 2(a), the
frequent threshold δ = 1, then Pr[sup(A) = 0∧ sup(B) = 0]
indicated in red, the part Pr[sup(A) ≥ δ ∨ sup(B) ≥ δ] can
be indicated in the set of green points, we note that when
δ = 1 Pr[0 < sup(A) < δ ∧ 0 < sup(B) < δ] = 0, thus not
existing in Figure 2. However, when threshold δ = 2 6= 1 in
Figure 2(b), Pr[0 < sup(A) < δ ∧ 0 < sup(B) < δ] = 0 can
be indicated in coordinate points in yellow.
Fig. 2. (a)λ = 0 when δ = 1; (b)λ 6= 0 when δ = 2
Therefore, we can get the conclusion that once threshold
δ > 1, computation of Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ] in
8
Therorem 6 is necessary. In other words, if the cloud can’t
complete the computation of Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ], the
verification in Equation (10) can’t be established.
Then we discuss the possible efficient resolution of the
computation on Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ]. To our best of
knowledge, existing popular efficient PWS based UFI mining
methods [3], [20] all utilize the pruning mechanism to avoid
the computation the probabilities of the unfrequent UFIs,
in other words, they only care and compute the probability
value of the UFIs, not the unfrequent itemsets in the part
Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ]. Thus we should design some new
extra method for its computation. We explore and analyze the
problem from the basis, X as a single item composed itemset.
Basis. X as a single item composed itemset. In this case,
the object Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ] will be simplified to
Pr[0 < sup(X) < δ], which means the total sum of the
unfrequent possible world probabilities containing X . Here
we can follow the similar dynamic programming way in
UApriori[3] to design the method. Similar to the notations
in [3], where the notation P≥i,j(X) was used to denotes the
probability that itemset X appears at least i times among the
first j transactions in the given uncertain database with N
transactions, here we use notation P<i,j(X) to denotes the
probability that itemset X appears less than i times among
the first j transactions. Therefore, the recursive relationship is
defined as follows:
P<i,j(X) = P<i−1,j(X) ·P (X ⊆ tj)+P<i,j(X) ·P (X * tj)
where the boundary case:{
P<i,j(X) = 1, j < i
P<0,j(X) = 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ N
Therefore, similar to the object P≥δ,N (X) in [3], here our
object can be formalized as P<δ,N (X). Then we can compute
it in the dynamic programming way depicted in Figure 3,
where we use the notation Pi,j(X) for the simplification of
P<i,j(X) above.
Fig. 3. Dynamic computation process for P<δ,N (X)
In Figure 3, the computation process is started from the
green grid as P1,1(X) and ended with the right top red grid
Pδ,N (X). According to the analysis in [3], the computation
process requires at most O(δ ·N) time complexity and O(N)
space complexity.
General. X as a multiple item composed itemset, |X| > 1.
In this case, the object Pr[
∧
z∈X 0 < sup(z) < δ] can be
notated as:
P< i, . . . , < i︸ ︷︷ ︸
|X|
;j(z1, . . . , z|X|)
where z1, . . . , z|X| is single item and z1, . . . , z|X| ∈ X . Thus
the recursive relationship is modified as follows:
P< i, . . . , < i︸ ︷︷ ︸
|X|
;j(z1, . . . , z|X|)
= P< i− 1, . . . , < i︸ ︷︷ ︸
|X|
;j(z1, . . . , z|X|) · P (z1 ⊆ tj)
+ P< i, . . . , < i︸ ︷︷ ︸
|X|
;j(z1, . . . , z|X|) · P (z1 * tj)
· · ·
+ P< i, . . . , < i− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
|X|
;j(z1, . . . , z|X|) · P (z|X| ⊆ tj)
+ P< i, . . . , < i︸ ︷︷ ︸
|X|
;j(z1, . . . , z|X|) · P (z|X| * tj)
(11)
where the boundary cases turn into:
P<i1,...,<i|X|;j(z1, . . . , z|X|) = 1, j < min{i1, . . . , i|X|}
P< 0, . . . , < 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|X|
;j(z1, . . . , z|X|) = 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ N
We can build dynamic programming based computation
process similar to Figure 3 as general high-dimensional case
of the one-dimensional case in Figure 3. We note that such
general computation process requires at most O(δ|X| ·N) time
complexity and O(N |X|) space complexity. Here we neglect
the details due to the space limitation.
We note that such basic verification mechanism illustrated
above can be used to verify the random faults caused by a
honest cloud, and the stupid cloud attack. However, once a
smart cloud aware of this mechanism as before, and returns
the elaborated fake values as the results, the basic verification
scheme will also fail. Therefore, we doubt why we can build
some enhanced verification mechanism to resolve this problem
and resist such smart cloud attack. Below we will explore and
discuss it in details.
B. Enhanced Checkers with Private Weights
Now we try to explore the potential similar private weights
based enhancement for PWS case below. After we assign the
weights and try to associate the possibilities of the itemset
between original database T and virtual transformed T ′,
unluckily, we find it difficult due to the properties of the
PWS. That is to say, it is hard to find some simple mathematic
relationship between X.pcntT ′ and X.pcntT :
X.pcntT ′ = φ(wz)z∈XX.pcntT (12)
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where function φ is the object function with the weights
wz, z ∈ X as its operands. The private weights enhancement
schemes holds in Theorem 2, 4, and 5 with some specific
qualified function φ due to the simple property of the sum of
support and expected support. And the good representation
property in Equation (12) is the crux of the success of
the virtual transformation, in other words, we don’t need
actual transformation from T to T ′, instead we can avoid
the transformation and compute the values X.pcntT ′ from
X.pcntT according to Equation (12).
We illustrated the problem with X = A, where A is a single
item, then in the basic verification scheme, if the item A is
UFI, then its frequent value will be computed and returned as
the form below:
A.pcntT = Pr[sup(A) ≥ δ] =
N∑
L=δ
Pr[sup(A) = L] =
N∑
L=δ
pL
where pL denotes the sum of the possible worlds’ value, in
which the support of the item A is L. We should mention that
the cloud will return the sum A.pcntT instead of the pLs.
Now if we apply the similar weighted enhancement verifi-
cation, the item A assigned by the weight wA, then
A.pcntT ′ =
N∑
L=δ
wLAPr[sup(A) = L] =
N∑
L=δ
wLApL
Here we compare the forms of the two equations above, the
relationship with the weight wA is hard to obtain:
A.pcntT ′ = φ(wA)A.pcntT
Thus in order to finish the enhanced verification scheme, we
have to compute the pL value then perform the transformation
wLApL, even we can get the closed form of
∑N
L=δ pL or∑N
L=δ w
L
ApL if luck enough. But in fact, unfortunately, it is
hard to obtain the closed form of
∑N
L=δ pL or
∑N
L=δ w
L
ApL
with better complexity compared with the original exponential
complexity problem if using brute-force enumeration.
Therefore, we can get the conclusion in this section as
Remarks: in PWS based outsourcing UFI mining scenario,
there exists effective basic checker mechanism, and its
enhanced private weights based resolutions can’t be built
efficiently enough. Though it seems a little upsetting, such
basic verification mechanism can be used to verify the
random faults caused by a honest cloud, which is still useful
for us. Besides, we can still find some more good news
from the case of approximate UFI mining method in the next
section, which will act as the bridge of the expected support
based UFI definition and PWS based UFI definition.
VII. VERIFICATION FOR APPROXIMATE UFI MINING
Due to complexity of the exact probabilistic frequent al-
gorithms, when uncertain databases are large enough, the
itemsets’ support follow Poisson Binomial distribution, so
that the approximate algorithms can obtain the approximate
frequent probability with high quality by only acquiring the
basic statistic itemset information, including support expecta-
tion, variance, with O(N) computation cost and reach satis-
factory result. Specifically, in [22], the authors proposed the
Poisson distribution-based approximate probabilistic frequent
itemset mining algorithm, called PDUApriori. However, this
algorithm only approximately determines whether an itemset
is probabilistic frequent, and cannot return accurate frequent
probability values. The Normal distribution-based approximate
probabilistic frequent itemset mining algorithm, NDUApriori,
was proposed in [4]. However, it is impractical to large sparse
uncertain databases since it employs the Apriori framework
according to [21]. In order to solve this problem, [21] proposed
NDUH-Mine to integrates the framework of UH-Mine and the
Normal distribution approximation in order to achieve a win-
win partnership in sparse uncertain databases.
It is claimed in [21] that the Normal distribution-based
approximation algorithms build a bridge between the two
different UFI definitions, expected support-based frequent
itemsets and the probabilistic frequent itemsets definition. In
detail, according to [4],
P (sup(X) ≥ δ) ≈ Φ(δ − 0.5− esup(X)√
V ar(X)
)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of standard
Normal distribution, and V ar(X) is the variance of the
support of X . Though there is no outsourcing approximate UFI
mining scheme, we can see that the crux of the outsourcing
approximate UFI mining scheme is the computation of the
expected support esup(X) and the variance V ar(X). Thus the
verification method should complete the verification of right
computation of esup(X) and V ar(X) in the remote cloud.
Below we discuss the details.
Obviously, the verification of esup(X) has been completed
in Section V in expected support UFI definition case. The
private weights based enhancement can be utilized well. Below
we study the verification of V ar(X). Due to the relationship
between esup(X) and V ar(X),
V ar(X) = esup(X2)− esup(X)2 (13)
Here we should mention that part esup(X2) represents the
expected support of the itemset when the existence probability
squares from the original values, e.g., the original P (a ∈
ti) = ai changes into a2i . Thus once we get the returned
values esup(X) and V ar(X). We first finish the verification
of esup(X), then verify the esup(X2) on the transformed
database T ′ : T → T 2 using the same methods in Section V.
It is worth mentioning that such transformation T ′ : T →
T 2 is necessary because we can’t establish the required func-
tion φ in Equation (12) even in expected support UFI definition
, which is the crux of the free actual transformation. The
private weights based enhancement also applies here. Due to
the verification of esup(X) and V ar(X) is combined with the
P (sup(X) ≥ δ) = X.pcnt, thus the approximate computation
result can be ensured by some accuracy.
The process can be illustrated as in Algorithm 1.
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Scenario Level Extra cost Random Fault/ Smart
Stupid cloud attack cloud attack
Deterministic basic - Y N
weight - Y Y
Expected UFI basic - Y N
weight1 - Y Y
weight2 - Y Y
PWS UFI basic time :O(δ|X| ·N) Y N
space: O(N |X|)
Approximate b/w time :O(N · |I|) Y Y
Algorithm 1: verification steps for outsourcing approxi-
mate UFI mining with returned V ar(X), esup(X)
(1) verify esup(X) on original database T according to
the methods in Section V;
(2) transform database T ′ : T → T 2 and prepare
verification values esup(X2) = V ar(X)− esup(X)2;
(3) verify esup(X2) on transformed database T ′ according
to the methods in Section V;
VIII. ANALYSIS
We present the comparisons and analysis on the schemes
proposed in this paper in Table VIII. All the cost values are
compared with the deterministic basic scheme in 1st line. We
note that in expected support-based outsourcing FI mining
scenario, there exists effective basic checker mechanism, and
its enhanced private weights based resolutions can also be
built effectively, which can detect all the cloud attacks in-
cluding Random Fault, Smart/Stupid attack. In PWS based
outsourcing UFI mining scenario, there exists effective basic
checker mechanism, however, its enhanced private weights
based resolutions can’t be built efficiently enough. Though
it seems a little upsetting, such basic verification mechanism
can be used to verify the random faults caused by a honest
cloud, which is still useful for us. After that, we can note the
further conclusion that the scenario of existing approximation
UFP mining, where we can see that our technique can provide
good probabilistic guarantees about the correctness of the
verification with some extra cost effectively.
IX. CLONCLUSION
In this paper, we extend the existing outsourcing FI mining
work to uncertain area w.r.t. the two popular UFI definition
criteria and the approximate UFI mining methods. Specifi-
cally, we design the basic checker mechanism verification for
expected support UFI definition to verify the random fault,
then propose two enhanced schemes based on the private
random weights mechanism for the sake of smart cloud attack
verification. Then we explore and design the basic/enhanced
verification scheme for PWS based UFI definition, which
is able to verify random fault/smart attack. We address the
efficiency and difficulty of the enhanced scheme for PWS
case. As the bridge of the two different UFI definition,
we further discuss the case of approximation UFI mining
verification, where we reduce the verification to the expected
support verification and provide good probabilistic guarantees
about the correctness of verification. Finally, we present the
comparisons and analysis on the schemes proposed in this
paper.
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